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Abstract 
Employees are motivated intrinsically as well as extrinsically. Intrinsic 
motivation is crucial when tacit knowledge in and between teams must be transferred. 
Organizational forms enable different kinds of motivation and have different capacities 
to generate and transfer tacit knowledge. Since knowledge generation and transfer 
are essential for a firm’s sustainable competitive advantage, we ask specifically what 
kinds of motivation are needed to generate and transfer tacit knowledge, as opposed 
to explicit knowledge. 
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1. Introduction 
Knowledge generation and transfer is an essential source of firms’ 
sustainable competitive advantage. The question is, which organizational form is 
most conducive to knowledge generation and transfer? The most prominent 
suggestion for organizing firms is to introduce market elements and prices through 
such methods as profit centers, spin-offs, or holdings. We intend to show that such 
organizational forms are suitable only under special circumstances defined by 
specific aspects of knowledge and motivation. In line with the knowledge-based view 
of the firm, we distinguish explicit from tacit knowledge. We ask what kinds of 
motivation are needed to generate and transfer tacit, as opposed to explicit, 
knowledge. To explore this question, we resort to a well-established and widely 
empirically supported social psychological theory of the interaction between intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivation. This theory, introduced into economics as crowding theory , 
is applied here to organization theory.  
Intrinsic motivation is not simply additive to the motivation induced by prices 
(extrinsic incentives). Rather, under some conditions the use of the price system 
undermines intrinsic motivation (crowding-out effect), making motivation endogenous 
to organizational forms. We argue that knowledge transfer is intimately connected to 
motivation and that sustainable competitive advantage requires a corresponding 
motivation management. We will demonstrate which organizational forms are 
suitable for generating and transferring tacit as well as explicit knowledge. In 
addition, we will show the type of motivation, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, these 
organizational forms should engender for effective knowledge transfer and 
sustainable competitive advantage.  
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2. Knowledge as a Source of Competitive Advantage 
Increasingly, firms are being restructured by introducing market elements 
such as profit centers, divisional units, or holdings. The idea is to exploit the 
advantages of the price mechanism by making the exchanges between the actors or 
departments more explicit and by rewarding employees according to their contribution 
to the firm’s profit. This strategy corresponds to a view of firms as the governance 
structure “of last resort, to be employed when all else fails” (Williamson 1975; 1985; 
1991, p. 279).  
This view, espoused by many economists, has recently been challenged:  
Today, we know that . . . to run a firm as if it were a 
set of markets, is ill-founded. Firms replace markets 
when non-market means of coordination and 
commitment are superior. (Rumelt, Schendel, and 
Teece 1991, p. 19)  
What “non-market” organization means is left unexplored. The resource-
based theory of the firm (e.g., Barney 1991; Prahalad and Hamel 1990; Winter 1995), 
which is the leading alternative approach to the economic view, is also vague with 
respect to organizational forms. Adherents of the resource-based view generally 
agree that the most strategically important resource is knowledge (e.g. Conner and 
Prahalad 1996; Grant 1996a, b; Kogut and Zander 1996; Langlois and Foss 1999; 
Liebeskind 1996; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Pettigrew and Whipp 1993, pp. 212–
238; Spender 1996). Knowledge differs from information in that  
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[I]nformation is a flow of messages, while 
knowledge is created by that very flow of 
information, anchored in the beliefs and 
commitment of its holder. . . . (K)nowledge is 
essentially related to human action.  (Nonaka and 
Takeuchi 1995, pp. 58–59) 
A further important distinction has been drawn between tacit and explicit 
knowledge (Polanyi 1966). Explicit knowledge can be coded in writing or symbols.1 
But only a small part of our knowledge is explicit; “we can know more than we can 
tell” (Polanyi 1966, p. 4). This distinction between the two types of knowledge is 
important because of the transferability and appropriability of explicit knowledge, as 
opposed to tacit knowledge (Grant 1996 a, b).2 Tacit knowledge is acquired by and 
stored within individuals and cannot be transferred or traded as a separate entity. 
Explicit knowledge has the character of a public good (with the exception of patents 
or copyrights).  
Two important consequences follow. First, tacit knowledge is a crucial source 
of sustainable competitive advantage because it is difficult for competitors to imitate it 
(e.g.,Teece 1998). Second, the contribution of a particular employee’s tacit 
knowledge to a team output cannot be measured and paid accordingly. This has 
important motivational ramifications. 
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3. Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation  
Following economists’ advice to “run a firm as if it were a set of markets” 
means rewarding employees according to their marginal productivity and relying on 
extrinsic rather than intrinsic motivation.3 
3.1 Conceptual Issues 
Employees are extrinsically motivated if they are able to satisfy their needs 
indirectly, especially through monetary compensation. Money is a “goal which 
provides satisfaction independent of the actual activity itself” (Calder and Staw 1975, 
p. 599).4 Extrinsically motivated coordination in firms is achieved by linking 
employees’ monetary motives to the goals of the firm. The ideal incentive system is 
strict pay-for-performance.  
Although many economists admit the existence of intrinsic motivation,5 they 
leave it aside because it is difficult to analyze and control (e.g., Williamson 1985, p. 
64). Even if the assumption of opportunism is an “extreme caricature” (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1992, p. 42), opportunism as a “worst-case scenario” is a prudent 
consideration when designing institutional structures (Williamson 1996).6  
Transactions cost theory goes a step farther by assuming that individuals are 
opportunistic and seek self-interest with guile. Opportunism is a strong form of 
extrinsic motivation when individuals are not constrained by any rules. In the 
transactions cost view, the task is to establish institutional settings that mitigate the 
hazards and costs of opportunistic behavior (Williamson 1985, 1996).7 
Motivation is intrinsic if an activity is undertaken for one’s immediate need 
satisfaction. Intrinsic motivation “is valued for its own sake and appears to be self 
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sustained” (Calder and Staw 1975, p. 599; see also Deci 1975, p. 105). Intrinsic 
motivation can be directed to the activity’s flow (Csikszentmihalyi 1975), to a self-
defined goal such as climbing a mountain (Loewenstein 1999), or to the obligations of 
personal and social identities (March 1994, p. 66; March 1999, p. 377). The ideal 
incentive system is in the work content itself, which must be satisfactory and fulfilling 
for the employees.  
The behavioral view of organization emphasizes intrinsic motivation. This 
approach has a long tradition in motivation-based organization theory (Argyris 1964; 
Likert 1961; McGregor 1960). Intrinsic motivation is also drawn upon by critics of 
transaction cost theory (e.g., Donaldson 1995; Ghoshal and Moran 1996; Pfeffer 
1997), as does the literature on psychological contracts (e.g. Morrison and Robinson 
1997; Rousseau 1995). They emphasize intrinsic motivation in the form of 
identification with the firm’s strategic goals, shared purposes, and the fulfillment of 
norms for its own sake. 
Proponents of the behavioral view tend to look only at the positive aspects of 
intrinsic motivation. They consider intrinsic motivation to be an undisputed 
organizational advantage because it lowers transaction cost and raises trust and 
social capital (e.g., Ghoshal and Moran 1996; Kohn 1993; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 
1998). However, intrinsically motivated employees do not always work to the benefit 
of their employers. Thus, intrinsic motivation has both disadvantages and 
advantages. 
3.2 Disadvantages of Intrinsic Motivation 
Motivation is not a goal in itself but should serve to support a firm’s goals. 
Enterprises are not interested in producing some kind of intrinsic motivation with their 
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employees, say, the joy of stamp collecting. Rather, employees must be motivated to 
perform in a coordinated and goal oriented way. For this purpose, managers must 
compare the benefits and costs related to motivating employees intrinsically and 
extrinsically. Two specific problems arise in connection with relying on intrinsic 
motivation in an organization. First, changing intrinsic motivation is more difficult, and 
the outcome more uncertain, than relying on extrinsic motivation, or carrots and 
sticks. For this reason, economists as well as managers traditionally prefer a reward 
and command policy (Argyris 1998). Second, intrinsic motivation can have an 
undesirable content. As history shows, some of the most terrible crimes have been 
motivated intrinsically, at least in part. Envy, vengeance, and the desire to dominate 
are not less intrinsically motivated than altruism, conscientiousness, and love. All of 
these motives contribute to immediate satisfaction rather than to achieving externally 
set goals.  
To discipline the effects of undesirable intrinsic motivation, external 
interventions via carrots and sticks are needed. Management makes unwanted 
outcomes of intrinsic motivation on coworkers, superiors, and customers costly and 
therefore less attractive.8 In a careful analysis, Hirschman (1977) shows that 
uncontrolled passions are generally checked by economic interests. Montesquieu 
(1749) took as self-evident in his doctrine of “’doux commerce’”  that “commerce 
improves and mitigates our behavior as we can see every day.” “Commerce,” or 
external reward, makes extrinsic motivated behavior easier to calculate than intrinsic 
motivation. 
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3.3. Advantages of Intrinsic Motivation  
Although intrinsic motivation has disadvantages, under specific conditions it is 
superior to extrinsic motivation in circumstances relevant for organizations. First, 
intrinsic motivation is needed for tasks that require creativity. In contrast, extrinsically 
motivated persons tend to produce stereotyped repetition of what already works (e.g. 
Amabile 1996, 1998; Schwartz 1990). In addition, experimental research shows that 
the speed of learning and conceptual understanding are reduced when people are 
monitored. With extrinsically motivated employees, therefore, the pressure of 
sanctions leads to lower learning levels and the work performed is more superficial 
than with intrinsically motivated employees (Deci and Flaste 1995, p. 47). 
Second, intrinsic motivation also helps overcome the so-called multiple task 
problem (Gibbons 1998; Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991; Prendergast 1999), where 
contracts cannot completely specify all relevant aspects of employee behavior and its 
desired outcome. Moreover, the goals to be set are often not clear to the principals. 
Financial goals cannot always be broken down into operational goals for employees.9 
Accordingly, contracts offering incentives to reach given goals can give rise to 
dysfunctional behavioral responses. Agents focus only on the rewarded aspects of 
the job and disregard the unrewarded ones. Nor do they have sufficient incentives to 
reflect on the adequacy of the goals they should achieve for the overall success of the 
firm. Multiple task problems are the subject of incomplete contracts, which are 
characteristic of employment contracts (e.g. Conner and Prahalad 1996; Simon 1951; 
Williamson 1975). Empirical evidence suggests that the outcome of incomplete 
contracts will not normally be evaluated by variable pay-for-performance. Rather, 
firms rely considerably on intrinsic motivation (Austin 1996).  
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Finally, and most important, intrinsic motivation enables the generation and 
transfer of tacit knowledge under conditions in which extrinsic motivation fails. In 
these cases, the multiple task problem is combined with the problem of “free riding” in 
teams. 
4. Motivation Crowding Effects 
If the two types of motivation were independent and additive, intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation could be managed by firms according to their relative advantages 
and disadvantages. The separation of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation would also 
correspond to a useful division of labor between psychology (focussing on intrinsic 
motivation) and economics (focussing on extrinsic incentives). However, a large 
number of careful experiments in psychology (e.g. deCharms 1968; Deci 1971, 1975; 
Deci and Flaste 1995; Deci and Ryan 1980, 1985; Staw 1975), as well as field 
research in economics (Barkema 1995; Frey 1997a), strongly suggest that under 
specific conditions there is a trade-off between the two types of motivation. The most 
important condition for this trade-off is the existence of intrinsic motivation in the first 
place. In psychology, the trade-off has been called the “hidden costs of reward” 
(Lepper and Greene 1978) or “the corruption effect of extrinsic motivation” (Deci 
1975).10 In economics, Frey (1997a) introduced the corruption effect as ‘”crowding-
out.”’ 
Many parents are intuitively aware of the corruption effect. Children who are 
initially enthusiastic about a task lose part of their interest when they are promised a 
reward for fulfilling the task. An example is the attempt to motivate children with 
rewards for doing their homework. In the short run, this measure is often successful. 
In the longer run, however, the effect is that the children will do their homework only if 
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they receive a monetary reward. The crowding out effect has set in. Moreover a spill-
over effect often occurs. The children don’t do any housework except they are paid. 
4.1 Analysis of the Crowding Effect 
Theoretical foundations for the crowding effect are based on cognitive 
evaluation theory (Deci 1975) and on psychological contract theory (Rousseau 1995; 
Schein 1965). These two psychological approaches have been developed largely 
independent of each other. Taken together, they specify the conditions under which 
intrinsic motivation is decreased or increased. These theories concentrate on 
preferences, i.e., attitudes referring to individuals′ structure of values. In contrast, 
traditional economists take values as constant and focus on constraints such as given 
prices, limited income, and time (e.g., Becker 1976; Frey 1999; Stigler and Becker 
1977). Our crowding theory acknowledges that observed behavior depends on both 
preferences and constraints, relative prices in particular. Thus, we combine 
psychological and economic approaches.  
Cognitive evaluation theory. According to cognitive evaluation theory advanced 
by Deci (1975), intrinsic motivation depends on the perceived locus of control. If 
the impetus for an action is attributed to an external influence, the perceived 
cognitive self-determination is undermined. Individuals who feel forced by outside 
intervention to behave in a specific way would be “overjustified” if they 
maintained their intrinsic motivation. The locus of control shifts from inside to 
outside the person (Rotter 1966). The actor attributes responsibility to the person 
undertaking the outside intervention.  
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A shift in the locus of control does not always take place. Each external 
intervention, e.g., a reward, has two aspects: a controlling and an informing aspect. 
The controlling aspect strengthens perceived external control and the feeling of being 
stressed from the outside. The informing aspect influences one’s perceived 
competence and strengthens the feeling of internal control. Depending on which 
aspect is prominent, intrinsic motivation is reduced or raised.11  
A positive effect on intrinsic motivation of an external intervention or institution 
is called crowding-in. A negative effect is called crowding-out. If achieving a task is at 
the same time extrinsically and intrinsically motivated, the more devalued the 
attribution of a self-determined action is, the more strongly the individuals believe 
themselves to be subject to outside control. What matters is that when one goal is 
taken to be instrumental for reaching another goal, the first goal loses its value 
(Kruglanski 1975). 
Psychological Contracts. Social psychologists (Rousseau and McLean Parks 
1993, Schein 1965), as well as some unorthodox economists (e.g. Akerlof 1982), 
suggest that contracts may involve strong emotional ties and loyalties. These 
socio-emotional relations establish an implicit contract that goes beyond 
transactional exchanges but include a reciprocal appreciation of intrinsic 
motivation. If such a contract is breached, the reciprocal good faith is put into 
question. In this case, as empirical evidence shows (Robinson, Kraatz and 
Rousseau 1994), the parties to the contract perceive that the employment 
arrangement is transformed into an extrinsically motivated (transactional) 
contract. For example, when guests express their appreciation of a host’s efforts 
with a symbolic gift (such as a bunch of flowers), the host’s intrinsic motivation 
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tends to be raised. However, when guests try to present money as a gift, the 
host’s intrinsic motivation is decreased.  
An important part of psychological contracts involves perceptions of fairness. 
Experiments and field studies show that fairness increases the willingness to perform 
and decreases shirking (Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger 1997; Kim and Mauborgne 
1991, 1998; Tyler 1990).  
The reciprocal appreciation of motives also explains why commands normally 
crowd-out intrinsic motivation more than the use of prices. Commands do not take 
into account the motives of the recipients, while the price system leaves the choice 
open as to whether one cares to receive the reward or not. 
Crowding theory. As pointed out, observed behavior depends on preferences or 
intrinsic motivation (emphasized by psychologists) and on constraints or relative 
prices (emphasized by economists). Crowding theory considers both (Frey 
1997a). External interventions, therefore, may have a positive or negative effect 
on work effort, depending on whether the effect on constraints or on preferences 
dominates.  
This relationship is illustrated in Figure 1, depicting a supply curve (S) for 
labor effort. As some amount of intrinsic work motivation is assumed to exist, the 
amount (OA) of labor effort is supplied even if no compensation is paid. If a reward 
(R) is paid to perform the work the price effect raises work effort to B along the supply 
curve S. If intrinsic work motivation is undermined, the supply curve is shifted 
backwards to S’. Work effort is thus supplied at point C. The figure is drawn in such a 
way that the motivation effect dominates the price effect: the rise in the reward 
reduces work effort from B to C. When the motivation effect is smaller, i.e., when the 
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supply curve shifts less backwards, a rise in the reward may well increase the amount 
of work effort. 
(Figure 1) 
Figure 1 underlines why the argument that it is prudent to consider a worst-
case scenario (Williamson 1996; Milgrom and Roberts 1992, p. 42)  is incomplete.  
Williamson’s (e.g. 1975, p. 48; 1996) basic assumption that the price system should 
be used to protect against the danger of opportunistic behavior promotes the 
conditions from which his argument starts. Figure 1 also enables a better 
understanding of Ghoshal and Moran’s (1996, pp. 21–27) critique of the behavioral 
assumptions of transactions cost theory. When the use of the price system in the firm 
crowds out intrinsic motivation, the proclivity toward opportunistic behavior increases. 
In the extreme case, there is no intrinsic motivation left.  
The crowding theory deals with the effects of changes in preferences and 
constraints on behavior. Since they may work in opposite directions (as in Figure 1), 
an empirical analysis is needed.  
4.2 Empirical evidence 
It is impossible to summarize here the results of the large number of 
laboratory experiments on the crowding effect. Fortunately, no less than five formal 
meta-analytical studies of the crowding theory have already been completed. 
Rummel and Feinberg (1988) used 45 experimental studies covering the period 1971 
to 1985; Wiersma (1992), 20 studies covering 1971 to 1990; and Tang and Hall 
(1995), 50 studies from 1972 to 1992. These meta-analyses essentially support the 
 15 
findings that intrinsic motivation is undermined if the externally applied rewards are 
perceived by the recipients to be controlling.  
This view was challenged by Cameron and Pierce (1994) and Eisenberger 
and Cameron (1996), who concluded that the undermining effect is largely “a myth” 
on the basis of their own meta-analysis of studies published in the period 1971 to 
1991 (the two studies are based on a virtually identical set of studies). These studies 
attracted a great deal of attention, and many scholars seem to have concluded that 
no such thing as a crowding-out effect exists. 
Deci, Koestner and Ryan (forthcoming) conducted an extensive study to 
show that these conclusions are unwarranted and that the crowding-out effect is a 
robust phenomenon under specified conditions. Deci, Koestner and Ryan 
(forthcoming) identified a number of significant shortcomings and misinterpretations in 
Cameron and Pierce’s analysis. Shortcomings include the omission of nearly 20 
percent of the relevant studies as outliers; the use of mistaken control groups; and the 
misclassification of some of the studies. In addition, Cameron and Pierce included 
dull and boring tasks for which a crowding-out effect could not occur, since the 
participants had no intrinsic motivation to begin with.  
To correct these failures, Deci, Koestner and Ryan (forthcoming) conducted 
an extensive meta-analysis including all the studies considered by Cameron, Pierce, 
and Eisenberger, as well as several studies that appeared after theirs. The 68 
experiments reported in 59 articles span the period 1971 to 1997 and refer to 97 
experimental effects. It turns out that tangible rewards undermine intrinsic motivation 
for interesting tasks (i.e., tasks for which the experimental subjects show an intrinsic 
interest) in a highly significant and very reliable way and that the effect is moderately 
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large. This undermining is particularly true for monetary compensations that were 
perceived by the experimental subjects to be controlling and therefore tended to 
crowd out intrinsic motivation. The crowding-out effect was stronger with monetary 
than with symbolic rewards. The crowding-out effect was also larger with expected 
than with unexpected rewards. When the problems at issue were complicated, the 
negative relationship between reward and performance was stronger than when the 
problems were simple (see Deci and Ryan 1985; Heckhausen 1991, ch. 15). In all 
cases, the behavior was initially perceived to be interesting and therefore intrinsically 
rewarding (Calder and Staw 1975).  
The relevance of the crowding-out effect is also supported by numerous field 
studies. In an econometric study of 116 managers in medium-sized Dutch firms, 
Barkema (1995) found that the number of hours worked in the company decreased 
under intense supervision by the superiors. These econometric results are consistent 
with circumstantial evidence proposed by McGregor’s (1960) theory X and theory Y. 
On this basis, Argyris (1964) suggests that strong control leads to an ever expanding 
need to increase control. 
Another real-life case for the crowding-out effect is provided by blood 
donations, as argued by Titmuss (1970). Paying donors for giving blood undermines 
the intrinsic motivation to do so. Though it is difficult to isolate the many different 
influences on blood supply, in countries where most of the blood is supplied gratis, 
paying for blood is likely to reduce total supply (Upton 1973). 
The crowding-out effect has also been shown to exist in econometric 
analyses for the so-called Not-In-My-Back-Yard syndrome, also know as NIMBY 
syndrome (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997; Frey, Oberholzer-Gee and Eichenberger 
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1996). In a carefully designed survey for a community located in central Switzerland, 
more than half the respondents (50.8 per cent) agreed to have a nuclear waste 
repository built in their commune. When compensation (in monetary terms) was 
offered, the level of acceptance dropped to 24.6 per cent.  
Baumol and Oates (1979), Hahn (1989) and Kelman (1981) observed that 
under certain conditions the introduction of environmental charges has little effect. 
When a punishment for environmental pollution is perceived to be strongly controlling, 
people are demotivated to protect the environment for intrinsic reasons. 
The crowding-in effect has been investigated less, but is supported by at least 
one econometric study. A cross-section analysis of the 26 cantons in Switzerland with 
varying degrees of direct democratic institutions shows that in cantons with better 
developed institutions of direct democracy, citizens exhibit a higher intrinsic 
motivation to pay taxes than in those cantons with less participation rights. Cantons 
with better developed democratic institutions are more informed and feel more fairly 
treated. Consequently they are less inclined to evade taxes (Frey 1997b). 
As pointed out, no crowding-out can take place if there is no intrinsic 
motivation in the first place. This condition obtains for simple jobs. In such cases, 
empirical evidence shows that the price effect increases performance. Lazear (1996) 
provides an empirical example. He finds that in a large auto glass company, 
productivity increases of between 20 percent to 36 percent of output were reached 
when the firm switched from paying hourly wages to piece rates. 
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4.3. Organizational Consequences of Motivation Crowding Effects 
Although general crowding effects have not been fully explored, we can still 
surmise the consequences of specific organizational designs on motivation. We focus 
on three aspects of crowding effects that should be taken into consideration when 
integrating market elements (such as profit centers or variable pay for performance) 
into the firm.  
Participation is an alternative to markets as a coordination mechanism. 
Participation signifies an agreement on common goals. Participation raises the 
perceived self-determination of employees and therewith strengthens intrinsic 
motivation. As experiments show, this the strengthening of self-determination and 
intrinsic motivation takes place only when agreements about the goals serve primarily 
as self-control and self-obligation. In contrast, perceived external control inhibits 
creativity in the pursuit of goals (see Schwartz 1990). These experimental findings 
support the concept of management by objectives as a process of joint goal setting 
between a principal and an agent (e.g. Raia 1974). The recent emphasis on 
“empowerment” (see e.g. Wellins, Byham and Wilson 1991) also reflects this 
relationship. 
Personal relationship in lieu of the anonymous market is a precondition for 
establishing psychological contracts based on emotional loyalties, often called team 
spirit. Team-based structures enable such personal relationship. As experimental 
research shows, personal relationship strongly raises the intrinsic motivation to 
cooperate (e.g. Dawes, van de Kragt and Orbell 1988; Frey and Bohnet 1995). These 
findings confirm that Likert’s (1961) linking-pin-organization as a network of 
interlocking teams indeed raises intrinsic motivation based on psychological 
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contracts. In contrast, neither perfect markets nor the price system rely on 
psychological contracts. An example is the anonymous relationship between buyers 
and sellers on financial markets. Adam Smith (1776) was one of the first to recognize 
that the absence of personal relationship or social atomization is a prerequisite for 
perfect competition.  
Contingency of reward on performance can crowd out intrinsic motivation. 
This holds provided the perceived controlling effect of reward is stronger than the 
perceived informing effect and the price effect is overruled. The crowding-out effect 
provides a possible interpretation for the overwhelming empirical evidence that there 
is generally no valid connection between pay and performance. Instead, the 
“literature on incentive plans is full of vivid descriptions of the counterproductive 
behaviors that piece-rate incentive plans produce” (Lawler III 1990, p. 58). The same 
holds for managerial compensation (for recent surveys see Barkema and Gomez-
Mejia 1998; Prendergast 1999), a fact admitted even by the proponents of principal 
agent theory (e.g. Güth 1995; Jensen and Murphy 1990), who favor time-based 
compensation and oppose strict forms of variable pay-for-performance in situations 
that need high intrinsic motivation.  
5. Combining Motivational and Knowledge Requirements 
Managing motivation, especially balancing intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, is 
an important and hard-to-imitate competitive advantage. This capability is crucial for 
all tasks in which the goals are difficult to formulate and where it is difficult to attribute 
task completion to particular employees. As pointed out, the generation and transfer 
of knowledge often constitutes such a task. At the same time the generation and 
transfer of knowledge is the most crucial resource of firms. Employees who are 
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extrinsically motivated could resort to free riding. This situation cannot be alleviated 
by strengthening the carrot-and-stick policy when the conditions for crowding-out 
apply. In such conditions, external interventions undermine the needed intrinsic 
motivation of employees. 
However, managing intrinsic motivation is difficult and often risky. Situations 
that require intrinsic motivation must be distinguished from those that do not. Markets 
rely systematically on price effects and therefore can crowd out the intrinsic 
motivation needed for specific forms of knowledge generation and transfer. We 
contrast organizational forms that integrate market elements into firms with those not 
using market elements.  
The following cases illustrate our basic point that when the transfer of tacit 
knowledge is at stake, introducing market mechanisms is bad advice (Chesbrough 
and Teece 1996). With the launch of its first personal computer in 1981, IBM chose to 
outsource all the major components. The microprocessor was bought from Intel, 
while the operating system was licensed from Microsoft. Moreover, the distribution 
channels were outsourced to a large number of retailers such as ComputerLand, 
Sears, BusinessLand, and MicroAge. The strong extrinsic incentives produced by the 
market enabled IBM to get its first PC to market in only 15 months and to launch an 
attack against Apple, the market pioneer. However, with the passage of time, IBM 
had to learn a lesson. Because outsourcing necessitates making knowledge explicit 
to allow production and service level agreements, the competitors in the markets for 
PCs had an open door to imitate. They could buy the same operating system from 
Microsoft, the same software from Lotus, WordPerfect, and Microsoft and use the 
same distribution channels. As a result, IBM lost much of its competitive advantage 
as well as its ability to direct the evolution of the PC architecture. 
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However, the right balance between insourcing and outsourcing is crucial 
because no company is able to develop internally all the technology necessary for a 
successful future product. Chesbrough and Teece (1996, pp. 70–73) discuss 
Motorola, a leader in wireless communication technology, as a firm that has chosen 
the right balance. To retain its competitive advantage over the long run, battery 
technology is critical for Motorola. It therefore develops the critical parts of its value 
chain (fuel cells and solid-state energy sources) internally and buys the less critical 
battery technologies, such as nickel cadmium, on the market. 
Table 1 presents a typology of organizational forms. It discusses which 
organizational forms can best enable the transfer of explicit or tacit knowledge with 
respect to the required extrinsic or intrinsic motivation. The four types of organization 
occur only rarely in pure form. For the sake of clarity, we will not consider hybrid 
forms of organization like strategic alliances and interfirm networks (see Koza and 
Lewin 1997; Miles et al. 1997; Sydow and Windeler 1998). 
(Table 1) 
Cell 1 describes the situation commonly considered by economists when they 
suggest running a firm “as if it were a set of markets.” Prominent examples of this 
advice are profit centers, spin-offs, or holdings. An effort is made to replace 
commands by contracts and transfer prices. This advice is well taken if the necessary 
knowledge to be transferred between the decentralized units is either encapsulated in 
a marketable product or is otherwise explicit. Only explicit tasks are communicable by 
means of contracts. In situations of a marketable product or a contract, monetary 
rewards and extrinsic motivation fulfill their task.12 In the case of profit centers, 
transfer prices referring to comparable market prices serve to calculate the 
 22 
contribution of each unit to the corporate outcome. Transfer prices help to remunerate 
leaders of profit centers according to their performance.13 
But as the example of IBM shows, a problem arises when the resources 
become imitable,14 The very idea of extrinsically motivated competition between 
decentralized units hinders the flow of tacit knowledge to where it is needed. 
Therefore the critical parts of the value chain should not be outsourced or separated 
into different profit centers.  
Cell 2 considers the case of “knowledge-based production teams.” The 
exchange of tacit knowledge is concentrated within an organizational unit. In addition, 
knowledge remains tacit and cannot be translated into action subject to commands.15 
Examples are the construction of complex facilities or the development of an 
outstanding product design like Benetton’s fashion design (Richardson 1996; Grant 
1996a). The tacit knowledge is embodied in the product itself or in the firm-specific 
routinized processes leading to the product. Because of the tacitness of this 
knowledge, it can neither be made explicit via reverse engineering nor can it be 
encapsulated in an expert-system software. In the case of Benetton, fashion design 
moreover has to be integrated with garment knowledge, Benetton’s own market 
knowledge, and its manufacturing expertise. As in the cases of IBM and Motorola 
mentioned above, such activities are the basis for a long-run competitive advantage 
in the form of core competencies that are difficult to imitate. To keep this advantage, 
these activities have to remain inside a work team and should not be dissected into 
profit centers or outsourced.  
There are reasons for containing tacit knowledge at both the team and the 
individual level. At the team level, competition between firms as well as between profit 
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centers hinders the transfer of tacit knowledge. The members of a unit have no 
incentive to give up their individual competitive knowledge advantage as long as they 
are compensated according to the unit’s profitability. Because of the uncodifiable 
nature of tacit knowledge as part of the multiple task problem, the transfer of tacit 
knowledge cannot be assured by a complete contract (e.g. Madhok 1997).  
At the individual level, employees cannot be identified and sanctioned if they 
hold back their tacit knowledge. Peer pressure, often presumed to be a solution to the 
free riding problem (Kandel and Lazear 1992), does not work here at the individual 
level. Agents cannot monitor one another or mete out punishments to those who do 
not process tacit knowledge. An example (particularly relevant to us) is the joint 
production of this paper. Each author is unable to determine the share of one’s 
contribution to the joint output.  
The well-known solution to the team production problem developed by 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) does not apply to tacit knowledge. Alchian and Demsetz 
deal with physical activities demonstrated by jointly lifting cargo into a truck. In this 
case, each team member would realize if another one is shirking. The team member 
acting as a residual claimant is able to assess the contribution of the other team 
members and can prevent shirking. Such assessment becomes more difficult if the 
product of team work does not consist in physical activities but in processing explicit 
knowledge, which is harder to measure. Preventing shirking is impossible when tacit 
knowledge has to merge within the team. The joint output can be evaluated solely on 
the market. Tacit knowledge can be efficiently marketed only if it is encapsulated in 
goods or services.16 It follows that in the absence of intrinsic motivation, free riding will 
take place. 
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So far, we have argued to what extent intrinsic motivation is required in 
knowledge-based production teams. But how can this required motivation be 
achieved? First, we have shown that participation and personal relationship foster 
employees’ intrinsic motivation because their perceived self-determination is raised 
and psychological contracts are established: the so-called “team spirit” is enabled. 
Second, crowding-out effects are to be avoided by refraining from individual variable 
pay-for-performance and the resulting competition. Empirical evidence shows that in 
teams, helping efforts are reduced by individual incentives (Drago and Garvey 1998). 
For this reason, time-pay according to the qualifications of the team members 
(Gibbons 1998) is often the practice. In team-based compensation, a crowding-in 
effect is produced if pay is accompanied by nonfinancial social recognition 
strengthening perceived competence.17 Third, effort can be put into selecting 
intrinsically motivated persons for the tasks at hand. In any case, an intrinsic 
motivation to generate and transfer tacit knowledge cannot be compelled but can only 
be enabled under suitable conditions. By its nature, intrinsic motivation is always 
voluntary.18 
The generation and transfer of explicit knowledge is not associated only with extrinsic 
motivation, nor does the transfer of tacit knowledge always require intrinsic 
motivation. Cell 3 deals with those cases where parts of tacit knowledge are made 
explicit. As Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, pp. 64–73) show, the conversion of tacit into 
explicit knowledge at the individual level is an important part of the process of creating 
firm-specific tacit knowledge. During this process, individual tacit knowledge is 
amplified and crystallized in the form of routines. According to the resource-based 
view of the firm, organizational routines, embodied in the individual′s as well as in the 
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firm′s tacit knowledge, are the most sustainable source of hard-to-imitate competitive 
advantages (Fransman 1998; Hodgson 1998; Nelson 1991). 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, p. 73) characterize the process of 
organizational knowledge creation as “knowledge spiral,” in which tacit and explicit 
knowledge interact during four modes of knowledge conversion. In the socialization 
mode, tacit knowledge is shared between individuals mainly as learning by doing. In 
the externalization mode, parts of tacit knowledge are translated into explicit 
knowledge. Externalization is supported by metaphors, analogies, narratives, or 
visuals. In the combination mode, different explicit knowledge is bundled together, 
mainly by the exchange of documents, computerized communication, or formal 
education. Thus, the body of explicit knowledge becomes enriched and systemized.  
In the internalization mode, the new body of explicit knowledge is conversed 
into rules of action and practice, i.e., the “firm′s memory” in the form of routines. 
Routines serve to enable the firm to deal with bounded rationality while at the same 
time acting as a repository of firm-specific knowledge (Winter 1995). To a high 
degree, routines are applied habitually and therefore become integrated into the body 
of tacit knowledge stored within individuals. At the same time, the habitually stored 
and practiced routines become integrated into the shared organizational tacit 
knowledge. The “knowledge spiral” turns around to a higher and richer level of shared 
knowledge.  
Thus, both socialization and externalization are required to create an ever 
growing body of organizational routines. Externalization is the dominant mode of 
knowledge conversion in Cell 3, while socialization is prevalent in the activities of Cell 
2. Externalization as part of the process of creating firm-specific routines takes place 
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in “knowledge producing teams.” Examples are quality circles or task forces. Both are 
widely used to enhance total quality and continuous improvement in many industries, 
e.g., in car manufacturing (e.g., Berggren 1994). Participants contribute their mostly 
tacit knowledge about the production process by using  e.g. narratives. The aim is to 
implement improved routines, which become part of the firm′s repository of 
knowledge. 
As in Cell 2, the knowledge transfer itself cannot be observed and measured. 
However, its outcome can be both observed and measured. This outcome can not be 
attributed to an individual working in a team. Hence, the conversion from tacit to 
explicit knowledge requires intrinsically motivated group members committing to the 
group (von Krogh 1998; Nonaka and Konno 1998). For this reason, in most cases 
these teams are formed voluntarily and their tasks are defined by themselves to 
support self-determination. 
Cell 4 concerns independent knowledge workers in a firm. They are 
independent in the sense that they are not working in a team with cospecialized 
workers with whom they share tacit knowledge.19 Examples are lawyers or experts in 
computing or finance. These workers rely strongly on their specific tacit knowledge. 
The application of tacit knowledge itself cannot be measured, but its output can be 
compensated according to its value to the organization. In contrast to Cells 2 and 3, 
this output can be attributed to the independent knowledge worker. In this case no 
intrinsic motivation is needed. But the performance of such independent knowledge 
workers does not contribute to a sustainable competitive advantage. Other firms can 
easily woo them away and profit from their tacit knowledge (Leonard and Sensiper 
1998).  
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6. Conclusions 
Our analysis allows us to draw four conclusions. First, intrinsic motivation is 
important for firms. It has great advantages in areas where prices and markets play a 
minor role. The decision to rely on and enable intrinsic motivation depends strongly 
on the need to generate and transfer tacit knowledge. This knowledge is an important 
source for sustaining competitive advantage as demonstrated by the resource-based 
view of the firm. The transfer of tacit knowledge within and between teams cannot be 
directly observed and the output cannot be attributed to a particular employee. At 
best, managers can observe the result of knowledge generation and transfer in terms 
of output. Explicit knowledge, on the other hand, is tradable. Managers are more 
capable of observing how well workers with individual knowledge have performed in 
this respect, and can reward them accordingly.  
Second, the crowding effects make both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation 
endogenous variables. Intrinsic motivation is not simply additive to extrinsic motivation 
induced by rewards. Crowding effects thus restrict the applicability of standard 
transactions cost and agency theory for organization design. The assumption of 
opportunism promotes the worst-case conditions against which these theories claim 
to protect. 
Third, we suggest under which conditions the proposal to introduce market 
elements such as profit centers or holdings are beneficial. Markets systematically use 
extrinsic incentives for motivational purposes. No problem arises insofar as explicit 
knowledge is to be transferred or tacit knowledge is encapsulated in a product or 
service attributable to a residual claimant. In contrast, if tacit knowledge of several 
team members is crucial for a joint output (either in the form of a product or in the 
 28 
form of explicit knowledge), the use of market elements may lead to withholding 
knowledge that is needed to establish and preserve the competitive advantage of a 
firm. When the transfer of tacit knowledge within or between teams is crucial, 
(transfer) prices as well as commands are unsuitable for motivation. Instead, 
organizational forms that emphasize participation and personal relationship, such as 
linking pins or overlapping teams, are needed.  
Fourth, firms may be interpreted in a new light. Firms are able to manage 
motivation better than the market. According to the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of intrinsic motivation, firm managers can choose an optimal 
combination and can obtain it by taking motivational crowding effects into account. 
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Endnotes 
                                                
1 Polanyi (1966, p. 4) explains the importance of tacit knowledge with the 
following example: “You can identify one face out of thousands, but it is nearly 
impossible to give an adequate description of this face to another person, so that 
she is able to identify the face.” 
2 The distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge should not be understood 
as a dichotomy but rather as a continuum (Zander and Kogut 1995). 
3 For a comprehensive survey on the existing economic theory and empirical 
evidence regarding incentives in firms, in particular the principal agent approach, 
see Prendergast (1999).  
4 For an extensive discussion of the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivation, see e.g. Atkinson (1964); deCharms (1968); Deci (1975); Staw 
(1975).  
5 Examples are intrinsic motivation in the form of trust (Arrow 1974), sentiments 
(Akerlof and Yellen 1986; Frank 1992), firm loyalty (Baker, Jensen and Murphy 
1988), managerial incentives (Güth 1995), implicit contracts (Akerlof 1982). 
6 See also Brennan and Buchanan (1985) for the case of the constitution. 
7 Therefore, the economic theory of organization has been called the “science of 
suspicion” (Sabel 1993). 
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8 For the same reason, extrinsically motivated warriors, in particular mercenaries 
or professional soldiers treated prisoners of war more humanely than 
ideologically or religously, i.e. intrinsically motivated, warriors did, see Frey 
(1999). 
9 This problem has led to the recent success of the balanced scorecard concept, 
see Kaplan and Norton (1996). 
10 Surveys are given in Lane (1991); Lepper and Greene (1978) and Pittman 
and Heller (1987). Kohn (1993) provides a popular application. 
11 See, e.g., the experiments in Enzle and Anderson (1993). 
12 This is also true in situations where coordination is effected by commands 
inside the firm, as envisaged by the authority-based view of the firm (e.g., Conner 
and Prahalad 1996; Williamson 1975). Commands can transfer explicit 
knowledge only. 
13 The problems connected with transfer pricing are extensively discussed in 
Eccles (1985). 
14 Empirical evidence for the car industry is given in Gaitanides (1997). 
15 The latter case is treated in Conner and Prahalad (1996). 
16 See Grant (1996a). He refers to Demsetz (1991) who, however, does not 
distinguish between tacit and explicit knowledge. But this distinction is crucial for 
our argument. 
 43 
                                                                                                                                
17 For empirical evidence see Feldman (1996); Staijkovic and Luthans (1997). 
18 While intrinsic motivation is crucial for cooperation within knowledge-based 
production teams, extrinsic motivation may have an influence on the decision 
whether to join a particular team. This refers to the distinction made by March 
and Simon (1958) between the motivation to participate versus the motivation to 
produce. To participate in a team depends often on extrinsic factors such as 
expected monetary rewards or reputation. In contrast, to contribute one’s tacit 
knowledge within a team hinges on intrinsic motivation. 
19 A possible supporting staff might contribute well-defined inputs such as basic 
clerical work, i.e., their relationship to the knowledge worker involves no tacit 
knowledge. In contrast to cell 1, the fulfillment of their tasks can be laid out in 
explicit contracts. 
